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A review of America’s post-Soviet strategy to-
ward Russia is long overdue. The illusions that once
guided policy are now at an end. What is needed is
a dispassionate approach to Russia, wherein
Americans would neither magnify nor excuse the
virtues and vices of the Russian Federation but
would accept the following realities:
• Russia is unlikely to become integrated into
the Euro-Atlantic community and is unwill-
ing to adjust its foreign policy priorities
accordingly;
• There is broad-based support within Russia
for the direction in which Vladimir Putin
has taken the country;
• Russia has undergone a genuine—if limit-
ed—recovery from the collapse of the 1990s; 
• Washington lacks sufficient leverage to
compel Russian acquiescence to its policy
preferences; and
• On a number of critical foreign policy
issues, there is no clear community of inter-
ests that allows for concepts of “selective
partnership” to be effective.
Any approach to Russia must be based on
realistic expectations about the choices con-
fronting Washington. The United States has two
options. It can forgo the possibility of Russian
assistance in achieving its key foreign policy pri-
orities in an effort to retain complete freedom of
action vis-à-vis Moscow. Or it can prioritize its
objectives and negotiate a series of quid pro quos
with Russia. The latter choice, however, cannot
be indefinitely postponed.
Seeking an accommodation with Russia is
more likely to guarantee American success in pro-
moting its core national interests while minimiz-
ing costs—but will require U.S. policymakers to
accept limits on what can be demanded of Russia. 
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Introduction
Why does the United States find it so dif-
ficult to establish and sustain a durable and
beneficial relationship with the Russian
Federation? 
The post-Soviet/post-Cold War U.S.-Russia
relationship has been one of the most studied,
discussed, and analyzed topics in internation-
al affairs. There is certainly no lack of advice
and guidance on the matter. Many of the
reports that have been written take a “rational
actor” approach—that is to say, by laying out
common interests and threats, these reports
presume that a blueprint for joint action can
be created that will serve as the foundation for
a renewed relationship.
In contrast, this analysis seeks to examine
the factors that have inhibited policymakers
from solidifying the U.S.-Russia relationship.
Whereas all bilateral relationships involve
a measure of give and take, this report does
not seek to provide advice to Russia on what
Moscow must do in order to improve the
relationship. This is not to suggest that the
Russians somehow are faultless. Indeed, one
can easily amass a long litany of Moscow’s
missteps, ill-conceived policy initiatives and
needless provocations, ranging from the
Kremlin’s inability to denounce the 1939
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to its clumsy and
ham-fisted efforts to use its energy resources
to extract concessions from neighboring gov-
ernments such as Ukraine or foreign compa-
nies working on Russian soil. 
But U.S. policy toward Russia—or any oth-
er major power—should not be solely reactive
to events; it must also be based on an honest
assessment of U.S. needs, interests, and capa-
bilities. And there are always risks when
embarking on such a venture; policies can fail
and new approaches do not always ensure
success. There is never a guarantee that the
other side will accept any U.S. offer; this does
not mean that the effort was worthless or
that the strategic assessments that served as
the foundation for the policy should be dis-
carded outright. Indeed, it is far easier to fine-
tune a policy or to discover a new tactical
approach if there is clarity about not only
America’s ultimate goals but also America’s
willingness to absorb costs. 
Regretfully, over the last 15 years, many
have clung to illusions that the United States
can achieve most of its objectives at little cost
and without having to make much accommo-
dation to the interests of others. That point of
view was particularly prevalent with respect to
Russia, which, having emerged from the
wreckage of the Soviet Union, seemed at times
to be in no position to thwart U.S. preferences
but instead to have to accept any relationship
on American terms. Increasingly, that is no
longer the case, because of Russia’s own recov-
ery from its mid-1990s nadir as well as clear
signs of “superpower fatigue” affecting Amer-
ica’s ability to sustain power and influence on
a variety of issues around the world.
The goal of this report is not to insist on
any one particular policy blueprint but instead
to focus attention on the need to make choic-
es and to be prepared to live with the out-
comes. Any U.S. policy toward Russia is going
to require trade-offs. Russia’s own economic
recovery in recent years, coupled with the
emergence of alternate international networks
that give other states the ability to bypass the
United States altogether, has reduced Wash-
ington’s maneuvering room. The following
piece of advice, by three respected analysts,
and meant to apply to U.S. policy in general,
perfectly sums up what this report hopes to
achieve: “We must face head-on and lean into,
rather than away from, the real choices that we
confront. Some are gut-wrenching in the sense
that they will force us to make truly hard com-
promises among sets of values, preferences,
and expectations that we don’t want to trade
off. That is no excuse to ignore or hide from
those choices.”1
The Failure to Consummate
Many Americans are tempted to look back
with nostalgia at a supposed “better time”
whenever there are difficulties in the U.S.-Russia
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relationship. In his memoir, Strobe Talbott, for-
mer deputy secretary of state in the Clinton
administration, recorded two such instances in
President Clinton’s conduct of policy toward
Russia. The first, in late 1993, was Clinton’s
lament, in confronting the complexities of deal-
ing with Boris Yeltsin (as well as the ongoing
impact of the Soviet collapse), “Boy, do I ever
miss the Cold War.” Seven years later, after a par-
ticularly grueling session with Yeltsin’s successor
Vladimir Putin—someone prepared to be far less
accommodating to American proposals—Clin-
ton told Talbott, “Let’s get this thing over with
so we can go see Ol’ Boris.”2 Today, as relations
between Moscow and Washington continue to
deteriorate, and as pundits ominously intone
that a new Cold War is looming between the
United States and Russia, even Republicans who
were extremely critical of the Yeltsin administra-
tion during the 1990s look back at that time as
preferable to the situation today.3
Despite the promise of a new and improved
relationship between Russia and the United
States in the immediate aftermath of 9/11—
when Robert Legvold of Columbia University
could write that “Russia and the United States
both stand on the verge of fundamental for-
eign policy choices likely to change dramatical-
ly their mutual relationship” with an eye to
crafting a true alliance between the two
states4—the old patterns have reasserted them-
selves. Today, Legvold declares, “Gone is the
talk of ‘strategic partnership,’ not to mention
the fanciful vision of a genuine Russo-
American alliance held by some . . . not so long
ago.”5
Has Russia—or the rest of the former Soviet
Union, for that matter—changed so dramati-
cally between 2001 and 2008 that an entirely
new approach is required? It’s true that the
Russian economy has begun a dramatic recov-
ery from the aftermath of the collapse of the
USSR and the 1998 financial crash and that
high energy prices have engendered what
some call confidence and others “petro-arro-
gance” within the Kremlin,6 but over the last
seven years, there has been no whole-scale
change in Russia’s strategic orientation that
would justify a major shift in U.S. policy.
Either the opportunities were overstated or
the differences are not so dire.
This narrative of past opportunities lost in
U.S.-Russian relations is compounded by
major and dramatic disagreements within the
American foreign policy establishment over
how to view Russia. Indeed, one cannot help
but wonder whether leading U.S. political fig-
ures are looking at the same country when
they make pronouncements. In July 2007, fol-
lowing his meeting with President Putin, U.S.
President George W. Bush declared, “Russia is
a good, solid partner,” citing in particular
cooperation on a number of strategic issues.7
Senator Barack Obama, a leading Democratic
candidate for president, had a much less posi-
tive assessment, telling the Chicago Council
on Global Affairs earlier that spring that
“Russia is neither our enemy nor close ally
right now.”8 But the chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph Biden
(D-DE), went even further, identifying Russia
under the Putin administration as one of the
three principal threats to the United States.9
Although the United States may have con-
tentious and difficult relations with other
important countries—such as China, Pakistan,
and Saudi Arabia—it is quite a sign of disso-
nance for a country like Russia to be described
by senior officials and policymakers as both a
strategic partner and an adversary at the same
time. And such divergent positions make fash-
ioning a coherent policy extremely difficult.
Take, for instance, the question of preventing
the proliferation of nuclear material. If the
United States government is so divided over
whether Russia is friend or foe, how can there
be meaningful intelligence cooperation be-
tween the two countries? In a climate of suspi-
cion, how can either side agree to grant access to
sensitive facilities? It would be almost impossi-
ble, for example, for the United States to “help
Russia obtain and maintain an effective, eco-
nomic, and reliable space-based early-warning
system” if a substantial segment of the U.S. for-
eign policy establishment was to decry the shar-
ing of sensitive and advanced American tech-
nologies with an “enemy” state.10 Meanwhile,
hostile rhetoric has surely stirred Russian suspi-
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cions about American intentions, further
undermining the prospects for rapprochement.
In such an environment of uncertainty, there-
fore, any policy that emerges is unlikely to be
based on a dispassionate analysis of U.S. inter-
ests—and certainly not from a genuine strategic
dialogue with Moscow.
A final ingredient to throw into the mix is
an assumption shared by many that the
default setting in any bilateral relationship
between the United States and another coun-
try must be friendship. Richard Pipes provoc-
atively titled his 1997 Foreign Affairs essay “Is
Russia Still an Enemy?” but nonetheless
began by noting that Russia’s pre-Soviet rela-
tions with the United States “were exception-
ally friendly” and that “seven decades of U.S.-
Russia hostility that followed the Bolshevik
coup d’état were the result not of a conflict of
interests but of the particular needs of
Russia’s conquerors, the Soviet ruling elite.”11
But what happens if the condition described
by Senator Obama—a Russia fated to be nei-
ther a close ally nor an outright adversary to
the United States—is the best outcome for the
United States in terms of fulfilling most of its
foreign policy objectives? 
The many discussions, commissions, and
committees that have advanced meaningful
proposals for structuring U.S.-Russia relations
since 1991 are remarkably consistent in their
recommendations for a durable, “interest-
based” relationship—one predicated on stem-
ming nuclear proliferation, combating inter-
national terrorism, strengthening the United
Nations as a more effective international actor,
deepening Russian integration into the global
economy, and promoting energy security.12
Moreover, presidents Bush and Putin have
publicly discussed these proposals at their
summit meetings—in Moscow; Bratislava; and,
most recently, Kennebunkport.
The problem is not the lack of an agen-
da—it is in getting Moscow and Washington
to move to the execution stage, to make com-
mitments and in so doing be prepared to
foreclose other options. Both sides are at
fault, but as former secretary of state Henry
Kissinger noted in February 2001, it should
be possible to manage a relationship between
Russia and the United States even when their
“national interests sometimes are parallel
and sometimes do not coincide.” However,
Kissinger went on to say, this “requires of the
United States that it have a clear sense of its
own priorities.”13
The Crucial Questions
On December 31, 1991, the United Nations
approved the request tendered by Yuli M.
Vorontsov, the Soviet Ambassador to the
United Nations, for the Russian Federation to
be recognized as the sole successor to the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in accor-
dance with the protocol that had been negoti-
ated among the republics of the Soviet Union
in Alma-Ata (Almaty), Kazakhstan, three days
earlier. 
Had the collapse of the USSR fulfilled the
conditions laid out by the administration of
Harry S. Truman in NSC-68—the first formal
attempt to define an official U.S. strategy for
the Cold War? That document directed
American policy “by all means short of war to
(1) block further expansion of Soviet power,
(2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions,
(3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin’s con-
trol and influence, and (4) in general, so foster
the seeds of destruction within the Soviet sys-
tem that the Kremlin is brought at least to the
point of modifying its behavior to conform to
generally accepted international standards.”14
To the extent that all of these things occurred
over the course of the Cold War, it is not clear
how much was attributable to U.S. actions. In
any case, a new set of questions must be
applied to U.S.-Russian policy since the end of
the Cold War, although these questions draw
on lessons learned during the Cold War and
even before.
No U.S. administration can hope to craft a
sustainable, enduring policy toward Russia if
it cannot provide definitive answers to three
questions. Were the forces that drove the
Soviet Union to expand its influence and led it
into conflict with the Atlantic powers a prod-
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uct largely of its Marxist-Leninist ideology, or
were they rooted primarily in earlier, pre-
Soviet Russian imperial tendencies? If the lat-
ter, does that mean that Russia’s national
interests will always set it at odds with funda-
mental U.S. security objectives whether tsar,
commissar or democratically elected president
sits in the Kremlin? Second, are American
interests better served by promoting separatist
tendencies across the Eurasian plain, or is the
maintenance of a unified Russian state con-
ducive to overall U.S. foreign policy goals?
Finally, is the existence of Russia—in its cur-
rent configuration—necessary for the func-
tioning not only of a regional Eurasian politi-
cal and economic order but also for a global
international system that supports overall
U.S. national interests?
Americans have often hedged their bets on
these questions. Public Law 86-90, passed in
1959 and still on the books, identified
“Russian communism” and its “imperialistic
and aggressive policies” as a “dire threat to the
security of the United States and of all the free
peoples of the world,” without clarifying what
was particularly Russian and what was partic-
ularly communist about the threat. In addi-
tion, a number of the “Captive Nations”
whose liberation that legislation calls for are
still constituent parts of the post-Soviet
Russian Federation. An influential text of the
early 1960s—Victor S. Mamatey’s Soviet Russian
Imperialism—described imperial expansion as
part and parcel of Russia’s historic aims and
“expressed the aspirations of the great Russian
people accurately enough.”15 George Kennan’s
famous “Long Telegram” of 1946 was more
nuanced; while identifying pre-Soviet Russian
expansionism as a problem, for Kennan it was
in the “new guise of international Marxism,
with its honeyed promises to a desperate and
war torn outside world” that the threat posed
by Moscow was “more dangerous and insidi-
ous than ever before.”16
American expectations have changed over
time. When, in 1990, Alexander Solzhenitsyn
suggested that Moscow, in addition to relin-
quishing control over the “outer empire” that
was the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, should
also allow the Soviet republics of the Baltic
States, the Caucasus and Central Asia to chart
their own destinies, this was considered to be a
radical declaration far in excess of stated U.S.
objectives at the time.17 By 2004, the proposal
for the creation of a common market (the
“Single Economic Space”) that would encom-
pass the territories Solzhenitsyn had identi-
fied in 1990 as part of a proposed “Russian
Union”—Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and
Russia—was denounced in the West as an
unacceptable manifestation of Russia’s “impe-
rial ambitions” and a plot to bring about a
“reconstituted empire.”18
Dissonance in the U.S. approach to Russia
could be managed during the 1990s when a
weak Russia was significantly dependent on
Western aid and when the Russian leadership
was prepared to make major concessions to
Washington in the hopes of accelerating
Russian integration into the West. In turn, the
United States was able to use a series of delay-
ing measures and vague promises to postpone
the inevitable day of reckoning—for example,
using the “Partnership for Peace” as a hedge
on the question of NATO expansion—with
the hope being that the states of the former
Soviet bloc and the former Soviet Union
would never qualify for actual membership or
that somehow the “Russia problem” would be
solved. But sooner or later, this maneuvering
room would run out, as NATO has expanded
not simply to encompass the former Soviet
satellites of Central Europe but states directly
on Russia’s own borders, and as countries
such as Ukraine and Georgia continue to press
for inclusion. Russia’s recovery from the trau-
ma of the 1990s has not only lessened
American influence over Moscow but has
allowed Russia to raise the costs of American
indecision. 
Russia will never be a perfect partner to
the United States; but very few nations are—
not even America’s close allies among the
advanced post-industrial democracies. Either
the strategic advantages Russia brings to the
table make it worth overlooking Russia’s
obvious faults or the cost of Russia’s help is
too high in relation to the benefits. 
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Washington would much prefer to avoid
these hard choices. For example, the U.S.
Congress is unwilling to graduate Russia from
the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik legisla-
tion, which prevents permanent normal trad-
ing relations with a state that restricts emigra-
tion rights—even though Russia had been
found to be in compliance with its require-
ments since 1994.19 Meanwhile, the Bush ad-
ministration continues to express its desire for
a closer relationship with Russia, but it is clear-
ly ambivalent about the prospects and not
sure about the price it is willing to pay to try to
work with the Kremlin. That uncertainty will
be passed to the next administration, which
will have no better luck in crafting and main-
taining an effective, coherent, and credible
approach toward Russia unless it is willing to
answer basic questions about Russia and to
dispense with any remaining illusions that
currently inhibit the formulation of a realistic
policy. 
Dangerous Illusions
Too often, outside observers have first cre-
ated their image of Russia, and then located
the appropriate facts and personalities to sup-
port their construction. Too often, hopes and
aspirations have been substituted for facts
when shaping policy. 
Dispensing with the illusions that have
guided policy toward Russia is a necessary
precondition for moving forward—even if it
requires abandoning cherished dreams of the
“Russia that might have been.”
Illusion No. 1: By Cooperating with the
United States, Russia Will Join the West
The first illusion is that Russia is destined
to become a full member of the West and
assume a position of leadership within the
Euro-Atlantic community. That was a dream
shared not only by many in the United States
but in post-Soviet Russia as well. Alexey
Pushkov, a leading Russian commentator who
was part of Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign poli-
cy team, recalled this:
Many of us thought the way forward as
the Cold War ended would be the emer-
gence of a new Europe, one not defined
by blocs, and where the old confronta-
tions and antagonisms would be gone. .
. . In the beginning of the 1990s, the idea
of a close partnership with the United
States, even an alliance, was popular in
Moscow. Although the Cold War ended
in the fall of the Warsaw Pact and the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the new
Russian elites were operating from the
presumption that democratic Russia
should not be treated as a defeated
country. On the contrary, we thought, it
should be included in the Western com-
munity as a new state that had decided-
ly parted with communism.”20
Even at the beginning of the Putin adminis-
tration, then–foreign minister Igor Ivanov was
still touting the “development of a constructive
partnership between my country, Europe and
the United States” that is “united by a common
responsibility for maintaining peace and stabil-
ity in the vast Euro-Atlantic area” and declared
that a goal of Russian foreign policy would be
the “preservation of a unified Euro-Atlantic
community, with Russia now part of it.”21
But were such expectations ever realistic?
The likelihood that Russia was going to follow
a path of internal development that would
bring its domestic institutions into closer con-
formity with Euro-Atlantic standards was
extremely low to begin with. Even if that had
occurred, Russia, as a Eurasian-continental
power, was going to have different interests
and priorities than either the United States or
Western Europe. Therefore, there could be no
expectations that Russia would automatically
support the general Western consensus on any
given issue. How to secure Russian coopera-
tion with Western initiatives without giving
Russia a share of the decisionmaking authori-
ty was the dilemma the United States faced in
considering Russian integration into Euro-
Atlantic structures.22
So the compromise position was to give
Russia a “voice but no veto” in the deliberations
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of the West. This was reflected in the negotia-
tions that led to the Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Cooperation and Security between
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the
Russian Federation, signed on May 27, 1997.
Washington hoped that, by giving Russia a for-
mal association with NATO, the path could be
cleared for enlarging the alliance by including
former Soviet bloc states.23
That compromise didn’t work. If Russia
was not going to join the alliance, Moscow’s
next preference was for an arrangement that
would essentially create a system of joint deci-
sion making between Russia and NATO on
major issues of European and Eurasian securi-
ty. Moscow was especially insistent that any
military operations outside the territory of the
member-states of NATO would require either
UN or OSCE sanction. The United States, in
contrast, wanted to keep a good deal of
European security matters designated as mat-
ters “internal” to NATO and not subject to the
purview of the NATO-Russia Council.
In analyzing the effectiveness of the Perm-
anent Joint Council, which was supposed to be
the principal organ of the NATO-Russia part-
nership, Peter Trenin-Straussov, in an assess-
ment prepared for the Berlin Information
Center for Transatlantic Security, concluded:
The [two] sides . . . failed to agree on
what the PJC would do and—as a result—
they got a ‘disabled child.’ The council
lacked a ‘home’ and a permanent secre-
tariat. It was also hugely asymmetrical in
operation—Russia was presented with a
joint position of the NATO members,
and could deal with NATO only en bloc.
If the Russians made a bid, its NATO
partners needed to go in retreat to dis-
cuss it and then present Russia with
their joint reply. This was cumbersome,
but ‘safe’, from the NATO point of view.
The Russians, for their part, soon dis-
covered that dealing with individual
NATO member states outside the PJC
was more effective and satisfying. The
PJC quickly turned itself into a talking
shop for rather stale dialogue.24
The creation of the NATO-Russia Council
in 2002 to replace the PJC created a system
where Russia could sit at the table with all oth-
er NATO members for discussion, but never
resolved the fundamental dilemma of what
weight Russia’s “voice” should have in alliance
deliberations. This has meant that Moscow is
not really a stakeholder in the alliance, while
making the partnership more effective has not
been a major priority for NATO members.
Major General Peter Williams, who headed the
first NATO Military Liaison Mission in
Moscow, made this assessment of the first 10
years of Russia’s partnership with NATO:
“Political will, structures and projects mean
little without resources. . . . The resources com-
mitted for the execution of NATO-Russia
Council policies and plans have been far below
those suggested by the political rhetoric.”25
Meanwhile, the question of Russian mem-
bership in the European Union is also off the
table as Russia and the Union attempt to devel-
op their set of “common spaces.” That has
proved difficult. For example, at an EU-Russia
summit meeting in Samara in May 2007, the
president of the European Commission Jose
Manuel Barroso explained that “Russia is a
European country that is close to us [the
European Union],” while Putin characterized
the Russia-EU summit as a forum for “coordi-
nating our cooperation.”26 Russia may be asso-
ciated with Europe, but both sides have clearly
come to the conclusion that Russia, for the
foreseeable future, will remain outside the
Union.
All of this should lead U.S. policymakers
to the conclusion reached by Cliff Kupchan
of the Eurasia Group: “The reality of today’s
international system is that Russia is rapidly
becoming a major non-aligned power more
along the lines of China or India than a
junior partner or disciple of the West.”27
Illusion No. 2: A Democratic Russia is a
Pro-American Russia
The second illusion casts the Russian mass-
es as anxious to support a U.S. global agenda,
but for the authoritarian tyrants who suppress
the will of the people. Those who embrace the
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“democratic peace” theory maintained that as
Russia moved further away from its authori-
tarian Soviet past, its interests would necessar-
ily converge with those of the United States.
Congressman Robert Wexler (D-FL) declared
at a 2003 hearing on the U.S.-Russia relation-
ship that “the success of Russia’s democratic
transformation will largely determine and
shape the present and future possibilities of
cooperation and engagement” with the
United States.28
It is a common assertion now in Washing-
ton that how Russia governs itself shapes its
foreign policy and that continued disagree-
ments between the United States and the
Russian Federation over foreign policy issues
can be attributed to a growing authoritarian
trend in Russia.29 The implication is that a
more democratic Russian government would
make fundamentally different choices. It might
decide not to object to its neighbors joining the
NATO alliance or drop its efforts to export its
energy resources directly to Germany and other
Western European markets, bypassing the tran-
sit countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Although such views are commonly held,
they are badly mistaken. First, it is important
to stress the wide support Putin receives
among Russians for his policies—something
the results of the December 2007 Duma elec-
tions confirm.30 In recent polls, 72 percent of
Russians agree with the assessment that
Putin has moved Russia “in the right direc-
tion” and identify with his call for a resurgent
Russia capable of playing a major role in
world affairs. While some might dismiss
Putin’s strong ratings as the product of a slick
propaganda campaign, his popularity is
based rather in the public’s assessment that
his government has improved the quality of
life for most ordinary Russians. Some 66 per-
cent believe that Russians in 2007 live better
than in the Soviet Union of 1991 (immediate-
ly before the economic collapses of the
1990s).31 And among 18- to 24-year-olds—the
demographic that supplied the foot soldiers
for the democratic “color revolutions” in
Georgia and Ukraine—the Putin administra-
tion has a 57 percent approval rating.32
Second, one cannot find a strong reservoir
of support for U.S. foreign policy among
Russians. Some 73 percent of Russians agree
with the statement that “the United States
cannot be trusted,” and 66 percent believe that
“U.S. foreign policy does not take Russian
interests into account.” More than 60 percent
of Russians see the United States as having a
negative influence in the world; more than
half believe that the United States is unfriend-
ly to Russia.33 Those sentiments are especially
true among young Russians aged 16 to 29—
the post-Soviet generation. In a 2007 survey,
almost 70 percent disagreed with the notion
that the United States “does more good than
harm”; 64 percent saw the United States either
as an “enemy” or at least a “rival” to Russia.
(China, in contrast, was viewed by only 27 per-
cent of respondents in the same way.)34
Even if President Putin had been inclined
in the early years of his relationship with
President Bush to join the “coalition of the
willing,” he would have had to defy the over-
whelming majority of Russians to do so,
since 89 percent opposed any participation
of Russian forces in an American-led coali-
tion in Iraq. With regard to Iran, a 2007 poll
indicates that 45 percent of Russians consid-
er Iran a friendly country; only 20 percent
agreed that a military strike would be justi-
fied if sanctions failed to stop Iran’s uranium
enrichment.35 A 2006 poll conducted by the
Pew Research Center showed that by a two-
to-one margin Russians were more likely to
view the U.S. presence in Iraq as a greater
threat to global peace than Iran’s uranium
enrichment program.36
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any
Putin foreign policy decision of the last sev-
eral years that would have been reversed by a
more democratically accountable Russian
government.
So, would a more democratic Russia be
more inclined to accommodate U.S. prefer-
ences? Would it agree to implement punitive
sanctions against Iran? Or to restructure its
energy industry to meet our needs? 
In a word, no. A more democratic Russia
would still not see eye to eye with the United
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States on a number of pressing issues—for the
same reasons that the United States and France,
despite both being democracies, have funda-
mental disagreements over foreign policy.
None of this is to deny that a more democ-
ratic Russia would benefit the United States in
some ways. Governments that are open and
transparent, and subject to scrutiny and criti-
cism, are generally more constrained than
authoritarian regimes and, in some ways,
more predictable. But we should not fall into
the trap of believing that if Russia were to
become more liberal, have genuinely free and
competitive elections and strengthened rule of
law, that would automatically translate into a
foreign policy more aligned with U.S. priori-
ties. The two countries have different objec-
tives.
Illusion No. 3: Russia Is about to
Collapse
The third illusion that must be dispensed
with is the assertion that Russia is near collapse
and that its recovery is but a house of cards—and
that, therefore, there is no need for the United
States to take Russia’s interests or preferences
into account when shaping policy. While such
sentiments have receded in the last several years,
they were quite pronounced when the Bush
administration first took office. Perhaps the
most famous example of this thinking was a
May 2001 essay in the Atlantic Monthly provoca-
tively entitled “Russia is Finished.” Written by
Jeffrey Tayler, an American journalist who had
lived and worked in Russia during the 1990s, the
article chronicled the “unstoppable descent of a
once great power into social catastrophe and
strategic irrelevance.” Tayler described post-
Soviet Russia as “Zaire with permafrost.”37
Conservative analyst General William Odom,
who headed the National Security Agency dur-
ing the Reagan administration, picked up this
assessment when he characterized Russia as
“weak, poor and ambling along [its] own paths
headed nowhere in particular” and a “marginal
power.”38
Russia continues to face massive prob-
lems—notably in its health care system and in
coping with an aging infrastructure. Its great-
est challenge is a very low life expectancy for its
male population that portends a labor short-
age and deprives the economy of decades of
potential productivity from the premature
demise of its citizens. But the Russia of 2007 is
far more capable than the Russia of 1997 in
coping with these challenges.
Russia has experienced robust economic
growth for the past several years, an average
of 6.8 percent per year. Russia is displaying
many signs of economic health. The govern-
ment no longer runs a budget deficit (and for
the last two years the federal budget surplus
has exceeded 7 percent of GDP), while the
state’s foreign debt has shrunk dramatically;
it was 100 percent of Russia’s GDP in 1999,
today it stands around 8 percent. By July
2007, Russia had accumulated gold and for-
eign exchange reserves of $413.1 billion—the
largest in its history. On August 1, 2007, the
Finance Ministry announced that there was
$127 billion in its Stabilization Fund—and it
set up that same month a reserve fund that,
over time, would be expected to total 10 per-
cent of Russia’s GDP and would exist solely
for the purpose of cushioning the federal
budget in the event of an oil price plunge.39
One cannot rule out the possibility of some
major disaster that could reverse Russia’s
recovery—but American policy seems based on
the belief that Russia will forever remain in the
debilitating condition of the 1990s and will
have no choice but to accept Washington’s
diktat. Any policy that assumes that Russia
will accept a status quo in Eurasia and the
world, or that is predicated on an assumption
of perpetual Russian weakness, is foolhardy
and dangerous.
Russia will never return as a superpower to
rival the United States. And Lehigh Univer-
sity’s professor Rajan Menon, a leading expert
on Eurasian affairs, is absolutely correct to
counsel Americans not to overreact to Russia’s
recovery.40 But Russia is resuming its position
as a major regional power with some ability to
influence the overall global agenda—especially
to raise costs for the United States to act. That
is multiplied if Russia can act in concert with
other major powers, especially China.
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Illusion No. 4: The U.S. (and Europe)
Can Fundamentally Transform Eurasia
at Little Cost
The fourth illusion is that the United
States, in partnership with the European
Union, is capable of fundamentally trans-
forming the geopolitical and geoeconomic
realities of Eurasia. A related conceit is of
building a network of stable, prosperous,
pro-Western states all along Russia’s periph-
ery that will give Moscow no choice but to
accept these new realities.41
For starters, the pace of European Union
and NATO expansion has slowed consider-
ably. Absorbing Central and Eastern Europe
placed great strains on both the Atlantic
alliance and the EU; continuing with further
expansion is highly unlikely, especially in the
near term. Romano Prodi, when he was pres-
ident of the European Commission, made
this perfectly clear at the close of 2002, when
he declared, “The integration of the Balkans
into the European Union will complete the
unification of the continent.” While Prodi
conceded that the process of EU enlargement
“has worked very well,” he went on: “We can-
not go on enlarging forever. We cannot water
down the European political project and
turn the European Union into just a free
trade area on a continental scale.”42
Expansion fatigue contributed to the rejec-
tion of the European constitution in France
and the Netherlands and led then-German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to vehemently
oppose any increases in the EU budget (and in
Germany’s contributions) for 2007–2013. And
there is no sign that new leadership in Europe
is prepared to resume eastward expansion of
the European Union.43
But even if full membership in Euro-
Atlantic organizations is not forthcoming,
what about extending a number of the privi-
leges of membership, including free-trade
agreements, visa-free travel, and rights to live
and work in Western countries? The European
Union has been willing to consider the exten-
sion of free-trade agreements, but with excep-
tions in place for agricultural products and
some industrial goods (such as steel), which
would nullify the benefits of access to Euro-
pean markets for countries such as Ukraine.
The U.S. government, meanwhile, has been
reluctant to take any such steps, other than
support for Ukraine’s inclusion into the World
Trade Organization.
The bottom line is that neither the United
States nor Europe is prepared to undertake
the massive effort that would be required to
displace Russia as Eurasia’s economic and
political center of gravity. Fifteen years after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, more than
75 percent of the GDP of the states of the for-
mer Soviet Union is generated by Russia.
Russia remains Ukraine’s and Kazakhstan’s
largest trading partner. The International
Monetary Fund estimated that guest workers
from post-Soviet states living in Russia send
home $12 billion annually. Official remit-
tances from workers in Russia, as recorded by
the IMF, make up approximately 16 percent
of Moldova’s GDP.44 Grandiose schemes for
a new Black Sea Commonwealth that bypass-
es Russia look wonderful on paper but don’t
correspond to realities on the ground. 
Illusion No. 5: The U.S. Version of
“Selective Partnership” Is a Viable Policy
Option
In theory, selective partnership is not a bad
concept. It was the basis of the “Grand
Alliance” in World War II, as well as the anti-
Taliban coalition that emerged in the weeks
after 9/11 between a disparate group of
nations. Indeed, most relationships between
states—even those who consider themselves
close allies—are often in reality “selective part-
nerships”; it is extremely rare that interests
and priorities between two different countries
are aligned 100 percent of the time.
Given the disillusionment of many in both
Russia and the United States over the failure
to build an effective working relationship as
allies or close strategic partners, selective part-
nership, on paper, seems to be the most feasi-
ble alternative. In this vein, the 2006 Council
on Foreign Relations task force report on
Russia tries to lay out a strategy for “how to
make selective cooperation—and in some cas-
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es selective opposition—serve important inter-
national goals.”45
Unfortunately, “selective partnership” has
been interpreted—both by some in the
Congress as well as in the current adminis-
tration—as meaning that Washington can
expect and will receive full Russian coopera-
tion on a whole host of important matters to
U.S. national security while being free to
ignore Russian concerns that conflict with
American preferences.46
For selective partnership to work, both sides
must have similar perceptions of threats, and
of the benefits of cooperation. As we are seeing
with Iran, however, this is not the case. U.S. sec-
retary of state Condoleezza Rice staked out the
U.S. position, “that Iran constitutes the single
most important single-country strategic chal-
lenge to the United States and to the kind of
Middle East that we want to see.”47 That is cer-
tainly not Moscow’s perspective. Russia is not
in favor of additional countries gaining nuclear
weapons, but those in the United States who
repeat the mantra that an “Islamist” Iran with
nuclear weapons would fundamentally jeopar-
dize Russian security are seemingly unaware
that, from Moscow’s perspective, Iran has, on
the whole, behaved as a “responsible citizen” in
Russia’s neighborhood—not extending sup-
port to Islamist rebels in the North Caucasus,
working to achieve a peace settlement in
Tajikistan, and cooperating with Russia in aid-
ing the Northern Alliance against the Taliban.
Indeed, Russia’s attitude toward Iran is not
unlike that of India toward Iran—this despite
the fact that India is the world’s largest democ-
racy and an emerging strategic partner of the
United States.
Like India, Russia may be prepared to pay
a price to accommodate U.S. concerns, even
at the expense of valuable economic ties with
Tehran—but achieving a non-nuclear Iran on
a U.S. timetable and leaving Washington free
to frustrate Russian interests elsewhere in the
world is an insufficient reward. This reticence
to cooperate grows stronger when, as some
U.S. foreign policy commentators have
advised, ending the nuclear stand-off with
Iran would open up its vast energy reserves to
U.S. investment, allow for new energy trans-
port routes to bypass Russia, and enable
America to further counter Russia’s overall
energy ambitions.48
Yet many in Washington continue to use
the rubric of “selective partnership” to argue
that Russian concerns about the expansion of
NATO or the increased American presence in
Central Asia are unjustified or at least
overblown. They further maintain that the
security challenges that threaten the United
States, including nuclear proliferation and
violent Islamic extremism, are also such a
threat to Russia that Moscow will have no
choice but to cooperate with Washington, and
therefore there is no need to accommodate the
Kremlin’s preferences.49 But there is a big dif-
ference between token cooperation and the
sort of active, engaged effort (including more
effective intelligence sharing or closer working
relationships between armed forces) that
could lead to major breakthroughs. General
Peter Williams points out, “It will take courage
to change this political and military culture of
noncooperation,” between Russia and the
West, but this cannot occur if neither side feels
that partnership serves their interests.50 At pre-
sent, breaking the diplomatic logjam requires
the United States to offer much more if it
wants Russian help. In discussing Russian
reluctance to embrace the U.S. position on
Iran, Graham Allison and Dimitri Simes made
this point clear: “Getting what the United
States needs . . . will require not only penalties
but incentives.”51
There is still hope for a partnership without
illusions in some key areas where both sides
have common interests, such as nonprolifera-
tion or combating nuclear terrorism. Neither
the United States nor Russia, for example, is
interested in a nuclear-armed Iran or witness-
ing a nuclear exchange between India and
Pakistan. Russian analyst Alexey Pushkov con-
tends that “Putin has not dropped the idea of
partnership with the United States altogether,
but he has definitely moved away from some of
the more grandiose proposals in favor of a
much more limited arrangement.”52 But for
Russia this means obtaining clear and tangible
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benefits, not vague assurances of future good-
will.
Making Choices
When we strip away these five illusions, we
discover a series of “inconvenient truths”—
the “democracy paradox” of Putin’s regime
enjoys broad-based public support; Russia,
especially now that it is in the midst of a
major recovery, remains the dominant Eur-
asian power; and the United States is no
longer in a position to assume or compel
Russian acquiescence to its policy prefer-
ences. Recognizing these facts forces us into a
long-overdue discussion about U.S. foreign-
policy priorities and where Russia fits in, tak-
ing us away from “having our cake and eating
it too” scenarios in favor of assessing whether
the costs of partnership with Moscow are
worth the benefits.
Reasonable people can disagree in terms of
their assessments of Russia and how to best
achieve U.S. interests. For example, many
Americans are displeased that Russia under
Vladimir Putin has moved in an authoritarian
direction and is in no way a “reliable” partner
for Washington on a variety of issues. Many
U.S. interest groups are not happy with the
restricted zone of civil and political liberties in
Putin’s Russia. In the end, the question we
need to ask is not whether the Russia that has
emerged is a Russia we like—it isn’t. The more
important question is whether it is a Russia we
can do business with, and more importantly,
whether or not the United States can achieve
some of its most pressing objectives without
Russian help.
For the last several years, the Bush admin-
istration has tried to compartmentalize the
relationship, hoping to preserve cooperation
on issues that are central to the United States
(such as counterterrorism and nonprolifera-
tion) while maintaining that acrimonious
exchanges on other matters (such as questions
of democracy promotion or Russia’s relations
with its Eurasian neighbors) need not damage
U.S.-Russian relations. But at some point the
two countries have to move beyond symbolic
declarations and “agreements in principle” if
there is to be real progress on any shared U.S.-
Russia agenda. President Bush, as well as all
the leading candidates who would succeed
him in January 2009, have identified the same
three foreign policy priorities: protecting the
United States from further mass-casualty ter-
rorist attacks; preventing “rogue” states from
acquiring nuclear weapons; and stopping the
spiraling costs of energy from destabilizing
not only the United States but the entire glob-
al economy. The record as of February 2008
shows that much work remains to be done:
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri
remain at large; Afghanistan and Iraq are in
serious trouble; Iran is on the path to becom-
ing a nuclear power; and energy prices are at
record levels.
U.S. policymakers have to decide whether
a resurgent Russia, the growing authoritari-
an trend of the Putin administration, and
Russia’s expanding leverage over energy mar-
kets—namely its ability to restrict flows of
natural gas to other former Soviet states and
to EU members—prevents the United States
from achieving its principal foreign policy
priorities or otherwise directly threatens core
U.S. interests. We may already have one clear
answer: Vice President Cheney’s Vilnius
speech in 2006 implied that he believed, as
Russian political analyst and Putin adviser
Gleb Pavlovsky concluded, that it was time to
eliminate “the vestiges of strategic partner-
ship between Russia and the United States”
and that as long as Russia remained under its
present government it would be nearly
impossible for the two countries to find com-
mon ground on key international issues.53
If the Bush administration has been com-
mitted to a policy of confrontation with
Russia, however, then U.S. policy has been
extremely deficient in making the arrange-
ments that would be needed for the U.S to
move ahead with its international agenda
against more active Russian opposition. One
would expect, for instance, a much greater
effort to expand NATO eastward coupled with
much more generous amounts of aid to con-
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struct a true cordon sanitaire against a reviving
Russia, certainly much more than the paltry
steps undertaken so far to encourage the emer-
gence of an alternative to a Russian-led Eurasia
via the creation of the GUAM Organization for
Democracy and Economic Development.54
On the foreign policy issue of greatest con-
cern to Washington—Iran—moving into a posi-
tion of greater hostility to Russia would also
severely complicate matters. Not only would it
effectively torpedo any remaining diplomatic
efforts to resolve the problem (including being
able to threaten genuinely effective sanctions),
it would mean American policymakers will be
left with only one real option: a massive mili-
tary strike. Such an attack would be likely to
precipitate a wider war that would require
major spending to overhaul and expand the
armed forces already severely weakened by the
Iraq war.55
Finally, a more aggressive posture toward
Russia would require the United States to
reassess its relationship with China—not only
for the financial support Washington would
need to gear up for these new challenges but
also to impede the development of any sort
of Sino-Russian axis designed to counter the
U.S. position in the world.56
Those who argue that Russia has little of
value to offer the United States in coping
with its most serious challenges might reach
similar conclusions. If the United States were
to assume the burden of stabilizing what
Brzezinski has called the “Global Balkans”—
a geographical “swathe of Eurasia between
Europe and the Far East,” encompassing pri-
marily the Middle East and Central Asia57—
and if it were to attempt to do so without
Russian support, then Washington has been
remiss in taking the necessary steps to ensure
it has the necessary resources and capabilities
at its disposal.
The reality is that, simply put, Americans
are understandably unprepared and unwilling
to shoulder the costs that moving to a more
confrontational stance with Russia would
entail. Meanwhile, many policymakers would
agree with the proposition that the United
States has bigger problems in the world than
focusing on Russia’s faults—notably protect-
ing itself against a major mass-casualty attack
and safeguarding the economic health of the
country. And finally, Russia is indeed in a posi-
tion to assist the United States in achieving its
principal foreign policy objectives. For all of
these reasons, a confrontational policy should
be rejected.
The problem, however, is that meaningful
cooperation is not possible if Russia is seen
primarily as an enemy who just happens to be,
at this particular time, a less immediate threat.
If Senator Biden was sincere in his assessments
of threats to the United States, it is difficult to
understand why Russia would cooperate
closely with Washington in dealing with Iraq,
Iran, and North Korea—in essence to remove
them as challenges to the United States—so
that Russia itself could then become the pri-
mary focus of U.S. attention. 
The outward show of good personal chem-
istry between presidents Bush and Putin and
their willingness to let this camaraderie define
their joint public appearances has counteract-
ed some of the voices in both countries that are
arguing against closer relations. An assistant
secretary of state or deputy foreign minister
who might be inclined toward confrontation
does not want to publicly contradict his or her
respective chief executives. But there is no guar-
antee that Bush and Putin’s successors will
have a similarly cordial relationship. Moreover,
forging a climate of mutual comfort—if not
real trust—that will allow for greater U.S. access
to Russia’s sensitive intelligence information
and its military and nuclear sites (not to men-
tion closer working relations with Russia’s
diplomatic and business establishments) can-
not be accomplished overnight. Moreover, it is
not something Russia can be bullied into for
the long haul. So any sort of grandstanding
that blocks real cooperation without measur-
ably improving U.S. security could be very cost-
ly—and that is not a price worth paying.
But what price is worth paying in exchange
for better relations with Russia? Is it worth giv-
ing Moscow something beyond vague assur-
ances of goodwill? In particular, what about
Russia’s demands that its paramount position
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in the lands of the former Soviet Union be rec-
ognized by the United States and that Washing-
ton cease what Moscow perceives as attempts to
interfere in Russia’s domestic affairs?
Russia has consistently maintained that
its primary interest is to ensure that no other
Eurasian state can obstruct Russian engage-
ment with the outside world and that no for-
eign troops are based anywhere in Eurasia
without Russia’s blessing (for example, to
combat international terrorism). As a result,
Moscow maintains that no Eurasian state
should belong to a military bloc or alliance of
which Russia is not also a member. Russia
has also expressed continued interest in cre-
ating a single economic zone so that Russian
capital and goods can move more efficiently
across borders. Within limits, Russia has no
objection to other Eurasian states developing
supplemental political and economic ties to
other states, as long as Russian vital interests
are respected. But Russia wants to create a
Eurasian economic and political zone where
Moscow sets the overall agenda.
Is acceding to such a vision something
Washington should consider? There is broad
agreement about what the United States is not
prepared to concede. No one argues that
Russia should have a blank check to use force
against its neighbors or to forcibly incorporate
them into a new version of the Soviet Union
and still have a “business as usual” relation-
ship with Washington. Russia should be held
accountable for all obligations (whether in
treaties, conventions or contracts) it has vol-
untarily assumed—especially when Russian
interests are being safeguarded by reciprocal
arrangements. Nor is the United States
inclined to give Moscow a veto if a core U.S.
interest is at stake—such as maintaining mili-
tary bases in Central Asia to sustain the ongo-
ing efforts in Afghanistan. Finally, Washing-
ton is under no obligation to pretend that
Russia is a democracy (in the Western under-
standing of the term) or to refrain from criti-
cism of the Russian government’s slide toward
authoritarianism.58
Between Russia’s stated preferences and
these bedrock American priorities remains a
great deal of room for finding consensus posi-
tions. Unfortunately, however, such a discus-
sion is not taking place. Consider this: In
March 2007, the U.S. Congress decided, by
large margins in both houses, that NATO
membership was the way for the post-Soviet
states to safeguard their independence, when
it approved legislation providing support for
Ukraine and Georgia’s bid to join the Western
alliance.
What was amazing was the near-total lack
of debate in the United States over what was
to be gained by including Ukraine or Georgia
in NATO. Few dared to ask whether the con-
tinual expansions of the alliance have weak-
ened its ability to function as a collective
security organ. Likewise, what the inclusion
of those states would contribute to solving
the major challenges to U.S. and Western
security posed by Iran, Afghanistan, North
Korea, and international terrorism was never
addressed, nor was the likely impact on U.S.-
Russia relations.
A zero-sum mentality for Eurasia—where
the United States is confronted by a binary
choice that only permits one of two out-
comes (Ukraine in NATO or Ukraine “lost”
to the West altogether)—flies in the face of
America’s ability to successfully balance mul-
tiple and sometimes conflicting priorities in
other parts of the world. In a number of com-
plicated bilateral relationships, Washington
has been able to avoid embracing the maxi-
malist positions of either side in order to find
acceptable, if imperfect, compromises. 
Early last year, Anatol Lieven, a long-stand-
ing critic of U.S. policy toward Russia, proposed
an arrangement whereby the United States
would agree to “abandoning NATO enlarge-
ment to [include] Ukraine and Georgia in
favour of mutually agreed restraints on western
and Russian behaviour on the territory of the
former Soviet Union.”59 In practical terms, this
might lead to a situation where the United
States would drop its opposition to Russian-led
multilateral institutions in which other
Eurasian countries participate on a voluntary
basis (such as the Common Economic Space or
the Collective Security Treaty Organization)—
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in return for Russian guarantees that any
Eurasian state is free to seek membership in the
European Union. (This would also then put the
onus on Brussels to decide when and where to
halt EU expansion.) 
These sorts of compromises do not satisfy
politicians in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova,
who would like nothing better than for the
United States to put its full political, military,
and economic might into changing their
geopolitical position. It is equally unsettling
for a number of American politicians who are
unprepared to recognize that the unipolar
moment has passed. But such an approach
seems to have the greatest chance of satisfying
the greatest number of U.S. objectives—acquir-
ing some security guarantees for Russia’s
neighbors, keeping the door in Eurasia at least
partly open, and paving the way for closer
cooperation with Russia on other issues.
Is There a Way Forward?
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has
often stressed the “excellent relationship”
between Presidents Bush and Putin, noting
that the two leaders “feel that they can dis-
cuss anything.”60 However, this personal rela-
tionship has not been translated into effec-
tive cooperation between the bureaucracies
of the two countries. It is unlikely that presi-
dents Bush and Putin will bequeath a lasting
legacy of cooperation to their successors. 
On the Russian side, in fact, officials just
one level below Putin have shown little enthu-
siasm for making the case for renewed cooper-
ation with the United States. The July 2007 res-
ignation of Igor Ivanov, the former foreign
minister who then became the secretary of the
Security Council, marked the departure of the
last high-level Yeltsin-era foreign policymaker
as well as someone who was still an advocate
for closer ties with the United States.61
Skepticism toward U.S. intentions is now the
norm in the Russian foreign policy establish-
ment. While this view may not be accurate or
fair, it nonetheless exists, and it hampers fur-
ther cooperation. It also suggests that the alter-
native to a difficult partnership with Putin is
not a better relationship with someone else.
On the U.S. side, the Bush administration,
from the beginning, found little support for
its efforts to engage Russia either in Congress
or within the U.S. foreign policy community.
There were constant irritants—some of which
were caused by the Kremlin’s own actions, to
be sure—which made it difficult to argue the
case that a closer and more cooperative rela-
tionship with Russia outweighed the con-
cerns.
By contrast, the United States has managed
to design a sound policy toward China, a coun-
try which is much less free and could pose a
much greater challenge than Putin’s Russia to
U.S. interests not only in East Asia but around
the globe. Serious concerns—about human
rights, the environment, Taiwan, and so on—are
nonetheless balanced within a cohesive, and
what we hope will remain a durable bi-partisan,
framework of engagement. The same could be
said of U.S. policies toward other undemocrat-
ic, yet strategically important, states such as
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan.
Moscow isn’t waiting for Washington to rec-
oncile these inconsistencies. As the U.S.–Russia
relationship has stumbled along, Russia, espe-
cially in the last five years, has begun to evolve
into a “post-American” country. There are still
several critical issues where Moscow and Wash-
ington continue to interact—control of nuclear
arms, negotiations in the Security Council, and
so on—but in terms of many of the day-to-day
matters that underwrite any bilateral relation-
ship, including trade, tourism, and other peo-
ple-to-people exchanges, the Russia-Europe
and specifically the Russia-Germany relation-
ships are much more important. Moreover, an
increasing percentage of Russia’s trade—and
not only in weapons systems—is with the largest
and richest countries of the developing world,
especially China and India. Moscow has also
begun to accelerate the development of new
international institutions that bypass the
United States, such as the Shanghai Cooper-
ation Organization.62
The sense that Russia is increasingly mov-
ing outside of an American-led system has
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contributed to a new feeling of self-sufficien-
cy in Moscow. In fact, Russia is now much
more likely to see itself evolving into an inde-
pendent center of global power.
What that means, therefore, is that, at pre-
sent, there is simply no basis for an alliance or
major partnership between Russia and the
United States, no matter how many reports
stress common interests. In the absence of
major linkages—particularly in terms of con-
necting the two countries’ business, military,
and intelligence establishments—the U.S.-
Russia relationship lacks the ballast to navi-
gate through the tempests that arise over
their differences.
What is far more feasible, given the cli-
mate in both capitals, is to have a relation-
ship characterized by a pragmatic approach
to resolving issues and preventing disagree-
ments from flaring up into full-scale crises.
That might not seem like much, especially
in the aftermath of grandiose rhetoric about
alliances, a world with no blocs, or the promise
of a new global order. And as memories of the
Cold War fade, it may not be apparent that the
state of affairs today is far preferable to what
preceded it—when U.S. policy was focused on
dealing with a Soviet state attempting to dom-
inate both Western Europe and East Asia and
trying to make inroads in Africa and Latin
America with an eye not only to an encir-
clement of the United States but the very de-
struction of our way of life.
For the time being, the U.S. government,
barring a profound transformation of the
Russian state, should be concerned largely
with Russia’s behavior beyond its borders and
be prepared to deal with Moscow on a quid
pro quo basis. That will require a change in
attitude, away from a post-Cold War Ameri-
can triumphalism back to a more realistic
approach. As former senator Gary Hart noted,
“Until recent years, when U.S. foreign policy
assumed a theological aura, we consistently
sought self-interested relations with disagree-
able nations.” The same holds true today and
into the future. “A working relationship is not
a favor to the Russians but an advantage to
us.”63
It is difficult to conceive of a solution to
any of the most pressing challenges facing
the United States where Russia does not have
some part to play. That may be galling to
those who reveled in the period of the imme-
diate post-Soviet collapse when Russia was a
supplicant nation and where the U.S. could
move ahead with its own vision for how to
structure global affairs without much con-
sideration for Moscow’s perspective. But the
situation has changed—and nothing makes
that clearer than Russia’s newfound position
as the third-largest holder of dollars in the
world (after Japan and China).
The United States has two options. It can
forgo the possibility of Russian assistance in
achieving its key foreign policy priorities in
order to retain complete freedom of action vis-
à-vis Moscow. Or it can prioritize its objectives
and negotiate a series of quid pro quos with
Russia. This choice, however, cannot be indef-
initely postponed.
The latter is the better course. Seeking
broad accommodation with Russia is more
likely to guarantee American success in pro-
moting its core national interests—especially in
a changing international environment where
the sources of power that sustain American
global leadership are weakening—but it will
require U.S. policymakers to accept limits not
only on what can be demanded of Russia but
also on the satisfaction of American prefer-
ences. If we are willing to accept this compro-
mise and part with our illusions, we can move
forward. If not, then U.S.-Russia relations will
continue to deteriorate, and proposals for
cooperation will languish.
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